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PROTECTING CONSUMERS AS SELLERS 
JIM HAWKINS 
 When the majority of modern contract and consumer protection laws were written 
in the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, consumers almost always acted as buyers, and 
businesses almost always acted as sellers. As a result, these laws reflect a model of 
strong sellers and weak buyers. But paradigms are shifting. Advances in technology 
and constraints on consumers’ financial lives have pushed consumers into new roles. 
Consumers today often act as sellers—hawking gold to make ends meet, peddling 
durable goods on eBay, or offering services in the sharing economy to make a profit. 
Consumers and business models have changed, but the laws have not. This Article 
uncovers the new role that consumers play as sellers and argues that lawmakers 
should reform outdated laws to protect them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) published it in 1952, 
they sought to unify and simplify the numerous, chaotic contract laws that existed 
across different states and industries in the United States.1 The consumer movement 
was not fully organized at the time.2 Still, even with the movement in its infancy,3 
the UCC plainly reflects an impulse to treat merchants and consumers differently,4 
and early commentary recognized that impulse.5 As the consumer movement grew 
in the 1960s and ’70s, Congress and state legislatures passed consumer protection 
statutes that offered consumers unique benefits.6  
Today, the impulse of the law to treat consumers differently than merchants is so 
firmly established that academic scholarship on contracts routinely invokes 
consumer status as a theoretical basis for different rules.7 Modern contract law, in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Notes & Comments, The Uniform Commercial Code, Section 1-206—A New 
Departure in the Statute of Frauds?, 70 YALE L.J. 603, 609 (1961); Karl N. Llewellyn, Why 
We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367 (1957). 
 2. Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant 
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 540 (1987). 
 3. Fred H. Miller, Consumer Leases Under the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 
39 ALA. L. REV. 957, 958–59 (1988). 
 4. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (fixing special 
rules for merchants under the UCC’s statute of frauds); id. § 2-207(2) (establishing different 
formation rules for merchants and non-merchants); id. § 2-314 (setting out the warranty of 
merchantability as only applying against merchants). 
 5. Recent Cases, Uniform Commercial Code — Construction — Inadequacy of 
Consideration Is Sufficient to Establish Unconscionableness of Contract. — American Home 
Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver (N.H. 1964)., 78 HARV. L. REV. 881, 898 (1965). 
 6. Miller, supra note 3, at 958–59. For several examples, see 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (2012); 
N.J. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to -210 (West 2012); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46–.63 (West 
2011). 
 7. See Recent Cases, Torts — Liability of Maker or Vendor of Chattel to Third Person 
— Manufacturer Is Liable to Ultimate Consumer for Loss of Value of the Bargain. — Santor 
v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)., 79 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1319 
n.26 (1966) (“Like the notice requirements, the requirements for an effective disclaimer under 
commercial law should depend on whether consumers or merchants are involved.”); see also 
Gregory E. Maggs, Internet Solutions to Consumer Protection Problems, 49 S.C. L. REV. 887, 
888–89 (1998) (“The legal system protects consumers in a variety of ways. For example, the 
common law of contracts and the [UCC] afford traditional safeguards to consumers. . . . 
Various specific consumer protection statutes supplement the general protection offered by 
contract and tort law. For instance, both federal and state legislation prohibit unfair trade 
practices. . . . Despite the existence of these laws, consumers continue to face a variety of 
problems. For example, consumers often do not realize the choices available to them in the 
marketplace. Also, consumers rarely fully understand the terms of contracts to which they 
agree. Moreover, consumers, in many cases, do not have effective methods of asserting their 
rights and resolving disputes.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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both cases and statutes, firmly establishes this dichotomy between consumers and 
nonconsumers.8  
Laws vary somewhat in their definitions,9 but these “consumers” that warrant 
special legal protections are most commonly defined in both state and federal laws 
as individuals or natural persons.10 For instance, the Truth in Lending Act, which has 
the leading definition of a consumer,11 limits a “consumer” to “a natural person.”12 
Although a “natural person” has the ability to both buy and sell, interestingly, 
when academics discuss “consumers,” they almost universally assume that 
consumers are acting as buyers.13 Lawmakers likewise act with this assumption in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 296 (2005) (“Beyond these legal dichotomies are status-driven 
dichotomies that cut across legal lines. Two such dichotomies important in modern contract 
law are consumer versus non-consumer and merchant versus non-merchant. These appear 
throughout the statute books and even, though unsystematically, in the rationes decidendi of 
the cases.”). 
 9. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (West 2011) (defining consumer 
as “an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state 
who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the term does 
not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million or more, or that is owned or 
controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million or more”). 
 10. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5481 (2012) (stating the same definition for the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c) (2012) (stating the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act’s definition: “The term ‘consumer’ means an individual.”); 15 
U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (2012) (stating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s definition as “any 
natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt”); see also Robert D. Cooter 
& Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
63, 66 n.18 (1987) (“A consumer is most simply defined as a natural person.”). 
 11. KATHERINE PORTER, MODERN CONSUMER LAW 23 (2016). 
 12. For instance, the Truth in Lending Act states that the “adjective ‘consumer’, used with 
reference to a credit transaction, characterizes the transaction as one in which the party to 
whom credit is offered or extended is a natural person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (2012); see also 
12 C.F.R. § 1026.2(a)(11) (2018) (“Consumer means a cardholder or natural person to whom 
consumer credit is offered or extended.”). 
 13. For only a few examples, see Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer 
Contracts: The Challenge that Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 723 (2008) (“Consumer 
standard form contracts (SFCs) are executed between firms that sell products and services and 
individuals who consume them.”); Garvin, supra note 8, at 309 (discussing how little 
information a “consumer buyer” typically has); Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging Worldwide 
Standard for Protections of Consumers in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity 
with Revised UCC Article 2?, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 223, 226–27 (2006) (“This Article’s focus is 
on how the Revision represents a missed opportunity for the United States to be a leader in 
what appears to be an emerging worldwide consensus in favor of providing consumer 
protections in the contracting process for sale of goods transactions. Our internal markets have 
changed substantially from the era when UCC Article 2 (Current Article 2) was first enacted 
and are now dominated by ‘strong sellers,’ which include, but are not limited to, chain retailers, 
such as Wal-Mart, Microsoft, General Electric, General Motors, and Best Buy. These sellers, 
because of their position in the marketplace and their bargaining power, are typically able to 
set contractual terms and conditions unilaterally.” (footnotes omitted)); T. Danielle Smith, 
Note, The Minority Approach that Could Protect the Majority of Kentucky Consumers: 
Relaxing the Privity Requirement for Implied Warranties of Merchantability, 52 U. 
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mind. For example, although the Truth in Lending Act defines consumers as natural 
persons, who presumably could act as the lenders rather than the borrowers, the Act 
limits consumer transactions to credit transactions that are “primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes.”14 Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code defines the term 
“consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, 
or household purpose.”15  
Limiting consumer transactions to those in which the consumer is the buyer 
probably made sense when these statutes were written. Personal computers, the 
internet, and cellular telephones, along with the power they give individuals to sell 
goods and services, had yet to be invented. There was no eBay, no Amazon 
marketplace, no Uber, and no Etsy. When states enacted the UCC and consumer 
protection laws, consumers were buyers, and usually, they were buying from larger, 
more powerful sellers. Because consumer buyers were in positions of weakness 
compared to merchant sellers, lawmakers drafted contract and consumer protection 
laws that reflected a strong seller / weak buyer paradigm and offered special 
protection to buyers.16 
Even at the time that it was written, Grant Gilmore, one of the UCC’s architects, 
recognized the limits on drafters: “The draftsman is called upon to build a coherent 
pattern out of the infinite variety of business customs and practices in an unstable 
and rapidly changing economy.”17 But, one of the UCC’s chief benefits is supposed 
to be that it is inherently adaptable and “provides within itself a method and principle 
of future growth.”18 
The drafters simply could not have anticipated the modern world, however. 
Today, consumers regularly hire other consumers through ridesharing apps like Uber 
and Lyft, employing those drivers to use their personal vehicles to take them 
somewhere.19 Uber alone currently has two million consumers selling driving 
services.20 Other consumers sell jewelry to gold buyers. They make shampoo and 
homemade soap in their kitchens and then sell it online on Etsy and Amazon 
marketplace. They sell used baby clothes and vintage books on eBay.  
Although the UCC was meant to adapt to changing business practices, the drafters 
anticipated moving from deals involving “horses and haystacks” to those involving 
                                                                                                                 
 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 583, 602 (2014) (“Sellers, both those that manufacture and those that do 
not, arguably have a greater knowledge about their good than an ultimate consumer [buyer]. 
Further, manufacturers are most often in the best position to protect themselves from liability.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h). 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2012). 
 16. James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: 
European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 125 (2003). 
 17. Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 
1341 (1948). 
 18. Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code–Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 
59 YALE L.J. 821, 836 (1950). 
 19. E.g., Always the Ride You Want, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride [https://perma.cc 
/Q8ZN-AERB]. 
 20. Garrett Camp, Uber’s Path Forward, MEDIUM (June 20, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@gc/ubers-path-forward-b59ec9bd4ef6 [https://perma.cc/A724-S457]. 
2019] PROTECTING CONSUMERS AS SELLERS  1411 
 
mass production.21 They could not—and did not—anticipate the fundamental 
category change from weak consumers acting solely as buyers to consumers also 
acting as sellers.22 As a consequence, the ability of the UCC to adapt to changing 
transactional forms has reached its limit. Existing law fails to deal with or protect 
this new category of consumers.  
Yet, despite this lack of protection, consumers who act as sellers face real risks in 
selling. Some risks are legal: In one famous Texas case, a boat owner took his boat 
to a mechanic for repair and then sold the boat, stating the boat was in “excellent 
condition.”23 The defendant “did not know the statements were false, nor did he make 
the statements recklessly,” but the Texas Supreme Court still held that the plaintiff 
had succeeded in bringing a claim for misrepresentation under the state’s consumer 
protection law.24 Other risks are financial, such as the risk of being underpaid for a 
good or service. In the gold buying industry, for example, sellers were offered $175 
for jewelry valued at $590.25 Finally, consumer sellers face discrimination in this 
new economy.26 Experiments have found that buyers pay minorities less on eBay 
than whites. “[Baseball c]ards held by African-American sellers sold for 
approximately 20% ($0.90) less than cards held by Caucasian sellers” in one 
experiment.27  
The market has fundamentally changed, and the law has failed to adapt. 
Moreover, existing legal scholarship also has failed to address either the shift in 
consumer roles or the corresponding lack of legal protection.28 This Article aims to 
correct this oversight. It argues that consumers in the modern economy engage in 
substantial economic activity as sellers and that these new consumers need new laws 
that protect them in their new role. 
Part I begins by exploring how contract and consumer protection laws safeguard 
consumers exclusively when they act as buyers. It shows how the UCC, the common 
law, state consumer protection laws, and federal law all offer numerous benefits to 
consumers, but only when they act as buyers. Part II explores economic and 
technological changes that have created consumer sellers. It describes gold buying, 
eBay, and the sharing economy as major economic spaces in which consumers act 
as sellers, and it explores the risks that consumers face in these markets. Finally, Part 
III argues that policymakers should protect consumers as sellers. It offers 
justifications for regulatory intervention and suggests specific policies that 
lawmakers should consider.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Gilmore, supra note 17, at 1341. 
 22. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism — Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1931) (arguing that the same law cannot apply to “dissimilar and 
non-simple fact situations”). 
 23. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. 1980). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra Section II.A. 
 26. See infra Section II.B & C. 
 27. Ian Ayres, Mahzarin Banaji & Christine Jolls, Race Effects on eBay, 46 RAND J. 
ECON. 891, 891 (2015). 
 28. See supra note 13. 
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I. BUYERS’ RIGHTS UNDER STATUTES AND THE COMMON LAW 
Consumers have many important rights that only apply when they are buyers. 
While some of these rights are easy to discern from the UCC, the common law, state 
consumer protection statutes, and federal law, others are not so readily apparent. In 
this Part, I explore these laws and show how they are fundamentally buyer-centric in 
terms of protections offered to consumers. 
The point of this Part is not to argue that every buyer’s right in these laws should 
have a seller’s right analog, but instead to point out how modern contract and 
consumer protection law is almost entirely a one-way ratchet favoring consumers 
acting as buyers. I explore some of the rationales for buyer protections, such as power 
and information asymmetries, in Parts II and III. For now, it is enough to remember 
that consumer buyers often lack the power that merchants have in these relationships, 
and merchants often have substantially more information. Yet, as Parts II and III will 
demonstrate, these asymmetries can sometimes benefit strong buyers at the expense 
of weak sellers. 
A. Buyers’ Rights Under the Uniform Commercial Code 
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) contains a variety of special provisions 
that are meant to protect buyers when the transaction involves a sale of goods.29 The 
most recognizable protections the UCC affords to buyers are found in the statute’s 
warranties. For instance, in every sale by a merchant, the seller impliedly warrants 
that the goods are merchantable, which in the vast majority of cases means that the 
goods “are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”30 While this 
warranty may seem commonplace to lawyers who learn about it in their first year of 
law school, it is powerful.31 As one example, it was one of the legal claims in the 
litigation against big tobacco companies that survived scrutiny.32 Case law explains 
the focus of the implied warranty of merchantability—to protect buyers.33 It protects 
them by, among other things, shifting the risk of nonperformance to the seller.34 The 
federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act makes disclaiming implied warranties to 
consumers difficult,35 and even if the warranty is disclaimed, the warranty at least 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. U.C.C. § 2-105 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 30. Id. § 2-314(2)(c). 
 31. Williston calls it “the broadest and most important warranty in the Uniform 
Commercial Code.” 18 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:68 (4th ed. 2015). 
 32. Franklin E. Crawford, Fit for Its Ordinary Purpose? Tobacco, Fast Food, and the 
Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1165, 1168 (2002). 
 33. E.g., Gared Holdings, LLC v. Best Bolt Prods., Inc., 991 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2013) (“The implied warranty of merchantability is imposed by operation of law for the 
protection of the buyer, and it must be liberally construed in favor of the buyer.”). 
 34. Vincent M. Gonzales, The Buyer’s Specifications Exception to the Implied Warranty 
of Fitness for a Particular Purpose: Design or Performance?, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 245 
(1987). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (2012) (“No supplier may disclaim or modify (except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section) any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such 
consumer product if (1) such supplier makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect 
2019] PROTECTING CONSUMERS AS SELLERS  1413 
 
injects information into the transaction because the disclaimer makes known the 
existence of implied warranties in the first place.36 
The second implied warranty is the implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose. Sellers warrant that goods will be fit for the particular purpose the buyer 
has in mind if the seller “has reason to know any particular purpose for which the 
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to 
select or furnish suitable goods.”37 The focus, again, is on protecting buyers from 
bearing the risk of loss.38 
Even express warranties under the UCC only operate against sellers in favor of 
buyers, not the other way around. Section 2-313 describes how “[e]xpress warranties 
by the seller are created.”39 The purpose of enforcing express warranties is “to 
underscore the integrity and efficiency of the bargaining process and to make it easier 
for the parties involved to allocate the risks among themselves through private 
agreements.”40 Yet, curiously, the UCC only protects buyers through its express 
warranty provisions. 
The UCC also protects buyers through less easily recognizable provisions. For 
instance, consumers as buyers can seek consequential damages for breach of 
contract, but sellers are limited to incidental damages.41 While some courts ignore 
the difference between incidental and consequential damages42 or assert the line 
between the two is suspect,43 the UCC’s exclusion of consequential damages for 
sellers often matters and puts buyers in a superior position in terms of remedies for 
breach of contract.44 As one example, the Supreme Court of Colorado refused to 
award damages to an aggrieved seller for fees it incurred after the buyer refused to 
accept delivery of a chemical. The court explained: “By holding that Bandimere 
could recover damages that were the consequence of Jelen’s breach, the court of 
                                                                                                                 
 
to such consumer Product, or (2) at the time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such supplier 
enters into a service contract with the consumer which applies to such consumer product.”). 
 36. I appreciate Larry Garvin bringing this point to my attention. 
 37. U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 38. E.g., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 849 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 39. U.C.C. § 2-313 (emphasis added). 
 40. Gonzales, supra note 34, at 242. 
 41. Compare U.C.C. § 2-712(2) (“The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the 
difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or 
consequential damages . . . .”) with id. § 2-706(1) (“[T]he seller may recover the difference 
between the resale price and the contract price together with any incidental damages allowed 
under the provisions of this Article . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 42. Henry Deeb Gabriel, The 2003 Amendments of Article Two of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Eight Years or a Lifetime After Completion, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 513 
(2011) (“[T]he courts have been apt to find what are in effect a seller’s consequential damages 
as incidental damages, and therefore have allowed these damages to sneak in the back door.”). 
 43. Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Response to Motion In Limine Regarding Damages 
at 5, Pucci v. Annapolis Sailyard, Inc., No. 10CV2968 (D. Md. 2010), 2010 WL 9068899 
(“The line between incidental and consequential damages is rather unclear.”). 
 44. Roy Ryden Anderson, In Support of Consequential Damages for Sellers, 11 J.L. & 
COM. 123, 127 (1992) (“[S]ellers do, at least on occasion, suffer consequential loss and that 
loss may represent the major portion of their damages. Nevertheless, the courts to date have 
consistently construed Section 1-106 to bar a seller’s recovery of consequential damages.”). 
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appeals blurred the distinction between U.C.C. seller’s and buyer’s remedies. Section 
4–2–715 specifically allows buyers to recover consequential damages resulting from 
the seller’s breach.”45  
The UCC explicitly prevents sellers from limiting buyers’ consequential damages 
for personal injuries. Section 2-719(3) states: “Consequential damages may be 
limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation 
of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is 
prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial 
is not.”46 Again, only buyers’ damages for personal injuries are protected by this 
rule.47  
Finally, the UCC benefits consumers when they act as buyers because there are 
provisions that privilege consumer buyers but no provisions aimed at consumer 
sellers. Section 2-502 gives consumer buyers who have paid for the goods the right 
to specific goods, whereas nonconsumer buyers have to show the seller is insolvent.48 
No provisions like this exist for consumer sellers, demonstrating the UCC’s 
assumption that consumers are buyers. 
B. Buyers’ Rights Under the Common Law 
In addition to contracts involving the sale of goods under the UCC, consumer 
buyers also enjoy important protections when contracting under the common law. 
Because the law of each state is different, the exact protections are more difficult to 
articulate. But, depending on the state, buyers obtain implied warranties when 
purchasing new homes49 and used homes,50 leasing real property,51 and hiring 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Jelen & Son, Inc. v. Bandimere, 801 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Colo. 1990). 
 46. U.C.C. § 2-719(3). 
 47. This Article does not argue that sellers should necessarily have the exact same 
warranties or remedies that buyers have; instead, at this point, it merely intends to demonstrate 
that the UCC conceptualizes consumers solely as buyers. 
 48. U.C.C. § 2-502. For an explanation of the provision, see Linda J. Rusch, Property 
Concepts in the Revised U.C.C. Articles 2 and 9 Are Alive and Well, 54 SMU L. REV. 947 
(2001). 
 49. See Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the 
Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists 
Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 13, 14–15 (1993) (“[T]oday a majority of jurisdictions 
have created such implied warranties, sometimes referred to as warranties of habitability or 
fitness for intended purpose, and other times called warranties of workmanlike or skillful 
construction, or even warranties of merchantability.”). 
 50. See Dean J. Zipser, Builders’ Liability for Latent Defects in Used Homes, 32 STAN. 
L. REV. 607, 609 (1980) (discussing judicial and legislative use of implied warranties to protect 
purchasers of used homes). 
 51. See, e.g., Jerald Clifford McKinney, II, Caveat Who?: A Review of the 
Landlord/Tenant Relationship in the Context of Injuries and Maintenance Obligations, 35 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2013) (“There are four traditional exceptions to the 
caveat lessee doctrine that have developed in the common law of many states: (1) a hidden 
danger in the premises of which the landlord, but not the tenant, was aware (i.e., the latent 
defect exception); (2) premises leased for public use; (3) common areas retained under the 
landlord’s control (i.e., the retention of control exception); or (4) premises negligently repaired 
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services.52 These warranties are all one way, benefitting buyers without 
corresponding implied warranties of any sort for sellers.53 
C. Buyers’ Rights Under State Consumer Protection Laws 
In addition to rights under the UCC and common law, consumers acting as buyers 
in every state make their purchases under the protection of unfair and deceptive 
practices laws.54 These laws vary by state, but Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) serves as a useful example of the benefits buyers 
enjoy under state unfair and deceptive practices statutes nationwide. Texas’s law 
offers numerous improvements for plaintiffs over the rules that the common law 
established, but the DTPA explicitly only provides these rights to consumers as 
buyers. 
One major benefit to consumers that the DTPA affords is that plaintiffs do not 
have to show the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. The Texas legislature 
passed the DTPA because common law fraud was so difficult to establish.55 To 
establish fraud in Texas (as in many states), the plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant specifically intended the plaintiff to rely on false statements.56 Establishing 
that specific intent, however, is very difficult.57 The DTPA allows consumers to bring 
a cause of action without proving that the defendant knew a statement was false.58 It 
is enough that it is a misrepresentation.59 
In addition to not having to prove any specific mental state, plaintiffs under the 
DTPA do not have to meet tort’s proximate cause standard. Instead, plaintiffs merely 
                                                                                                                 
 
by the landlord.”). 
 52. See Shubha Ghosh, Decentering the Consuming Self: Personalized Medicine, 
Science, and the Market for Lemons, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 299, 335 (2015) (“Some 
states, such as Texas, have expanded the reach of implied warranties under the UCC to the 
provision of services.”). 
 53. Again, the point is not that the common law should have corresponding seller 
warranties for each of these buyer warranties but rather that the common law attempts to 
protect buyers, not sellers. 
 54. Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We Buy Now, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. 315, 363 (2017). 
 55. RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW ch. 1 (2017). 
 56. Shannon v. Law-Yone, 950 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. App. 1997) (“The elements of 
common-law fraud or misrepresentation are: 1) a material misrepresentation was made; 2) the 
misrepresentation was false; 3) it was false at the time it was made; 4) the speaker knew it was 
false or made the misrepresentation recklessly without any knowledge of its truth or falsity; 5) 
the misrepresentation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the recipient; 6) the 
recipient did act in reliance; and 7) the recipient was injured as a result of that reliance (i.e. 
damages).”). 
 57. Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of Cognate 
Civil and Criminal Statutes, 69 IND. L.J. 335, 368 (1994). 
 58. Texas’s statute is similar to other states in making misrepresentation claims easier to 
establish. Edward X. Clinton, Jr., Do Businesses Have Standing to Sue Under State Consumer 
Fraud Statutes?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 385 (1996). 
 59. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689–90 (Tex. 1980). 
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have to prove that the defendant’s conduct was the producing cause of an injury.60 
While producing cause is similar to proximate cause because both require proof the 
conduct was the cause in fact of the injury, “the proximate cause element of a 
negligence claim requires greater foreseeability.”61 
Another important provision in some state consumer protection laws makes 
unconscionability a cause of action and not just a defense to breach of contract. Under 
traditional contract law, unconscionability operates solely as a defense to breach of 
contract. In the famous Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. case, for instance, 
the court established that an unconscionable contract is not enforceable.62 It simply 
stopped the business from enforcing the contract; it did not give the consumer the 
right to any damages for the business’s illicit behavior. The DTPA, however, enables 
consumers to use unconscionability as a cause of action: “A consumer may maintain 
an action where any of the following constitute a producing cause of economic 
damages . . . any unconscionable action or course of action by any person.”63 Where 
other causes of action do not fit defendants’ conduct exactly, unconscionability can 
provide relief to consumers. In New Mexico, consumers have used unconscionability 
to obtain restitution from unfair payday loans.64 
Finally, plaintiffs enjoyed substantially enhanced remedies under the DTPA. 
Unlike the norm in contract causes of action, DTPA plaintiffs can recover punitive 
damages in some cases.65 Also, unlike most common law causes of action, a DTPA 
plaintiff can recover attorney’s fees.66 
While the DTPA provides many advantages to plaintiffs, it only offers these 
advantages when consumers are buying. To qualify for relief under the statute, 
plaintiffs must establish that they sought or acquired goods or services by purchase 
or lease.67 Plaintiffs who do not meet this narrow definition fall outside of the 
DTPA’s protection.68 Texas’s emphasis on consumers exclusively being buyers is 
not unique.69  
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (West 2011). 
 61. Bryant v. S.A.S., 416 S.W.3d 52, 58 (Tex. App. 2013), order withdrawn (Dec. 19, 
2014); see also Church & Dwight Co. v. Huey, 961 S.W.2d 560, 569 (Tex. App. 1997) (“Such 
a cause has the same cause-in-fact element as proximate cause, but does not require 
foreseeablity [sic].”). 
 62. 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 63. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3). 
 64. Associated Press, New Mexico Judge Orders FastBucks to Pay $32M in Restitution, 
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:23 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/885701/new 
-mexico-judge-orders-fastbucks-to-pay-32m-in-restitution.html [https://perma.cc/EY5A 
-LK8R]. 
 65. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1). 
 66. Id. § 17.50(c). 
 67. Id. § 17.45(4). 
 68. E.g., March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889, 896 (Tex. App. 1987). 
 69. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-1 (West 2008) (“‘Consumer’ means a natural 
person who, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, purchases, attempts to 
purchase, or is solicited to purchase goods or services or who commits money, property, or 
services in a personal investment.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752 (West 2013) (“‘Consumer 
transaction’ means the advertising, offering for sale or purchase, sale, purchase, or distribution 
of any services or any property . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 81.150 (2017) (“‘Consumer’ means 
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D. Buyers’ Rights Under Federal Law 
Finally, following these state laws, federal laws aimed at protecting consumers 
also solely focus on consumers who are buyers. As I mentioned in the Introduction, 
federal consumer law defines the transactions that different acts apply to by focusing 
on consumers’ buying.70 One major locus of federal consumer law is the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”). Interestingly, the FTC Act does not say 
anything about protecting consumers or individuals or helping buyers or sellers, but 
instead it simply outlaws “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices.”71 Theoretically, the FTC could use its authority to protect both 
buyers and sellers who suffer from unfair and deceptive conduct. 
And yet, both the FTC and courts interpreting the FTC Act assume that the entities 
that the Act protects are buyers. As one example, when the FTC created a policy 
statement on its authority to prevent unfair acts in commerce in 1980, it placed its 
emphasis on injuries to consumers.72 That standard is now part of the Act itself.73  
More recently, in the context of the sharing economy where consumers plainly 
act as sellers (as discussed in Section II.C), the FTC exclusively considers buying 
consumers to be “consumers.” It ignores people who are selling services in their 
capacity as sellers. In a report on the sharing economy, the FTC contrasts “suppliers 
(who frequently are individuals or small entities) and consumers.”74 In both this 
example and the unfairness example, it is plain that the FTC views its authority as 
limited to correcting market failures that buyers experience, not sellers. 
In terms of judicial approaches to the FTC Act, consider this summary of the 
relevant legal principles governing the FTC Act from the Second Circuit75: 
The central purpose of the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act under discussion is in effect to abolish the rule of caveat emptor [i.e., 
buyer beware] which traditionally defined rights and responsibilities in 
the world of commerce. . . . [It] has been replaced by a rule which gives 
to the consumer the right to rely upon representations of facts as the truth 
                                                                                                                 
 
an individual who is purchasing goods or services for personal, family or household 
purposes.”). 
 70. See supra notes 10–12. 
 71. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby 
declared unlawful.”). 
 72. JOHN A. SPANOGLE, RALPH J. ROHNER, DEE PRIDGEN & JEFF SOVERN, CONSUMER 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 67–68 (3d ed. 2007). 
 73. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (defining an “unfair act” only as an act that “causes or is likely 
to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”). 
 74. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING PLATFORMS, 




 75. See SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 72, at 36 (stating that the Sterling Drug opinion 
summarizes existing law on the FTC Act). 
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. . . . “[T]he buying public does not ordinarily carefully study or weigh 
each word in an advertisement. The ultimate impression upon the mind 
of the reader arises from the sum total of not only what is said but also 
of all that is reasonably implied.” . . . [The law] has very little faith indeed 
in the intellectual acuity of the “ordinary purchaser” who is the object of 
the advertising campaign. . . . “The average purchaser has been variously 
characterized as not ‘straight thinking’ . . . . The language of the ordinary 
purchaser is casual and unaffected.”76 
Repeatedly, the court emphasizes that the FTC Act protects consumers and that 
consumers are only buyers or purchasers.  
Like under the UCC, the common law, and Texas’s DTPA, federal consumer law 
protects consumers only as buyers. Buyers are weak individuals, this approach 
assumes, and sellers are often strong businesses. As the next Part explains, however, 
a significant number of consumers in the modern economy act as sellers. 
II. CONSUMERS SELLING 
Because of changing market conditions and changing technology, consumers 
have increasingly taken on the role of sellers. This Part outlines three important 
spaces in which consumers predominately sell, and it demonstrates the dearth of laws 
to protect consumers and the numerous risks consumers face as sellers in these 
markets. In the first example, gold buying, market conditions have created an 
environment for consumers to become sellers. In the two other examples, eBay and 
the sharing economy, technological changes have provided a novel capacity for 
consumers to act as sellers. 
A. Gold Buying 
For consumers on the fringe of the mainstream economy, payday lenders, title 
lenders, pawn shops, and check cashers serve as alternatives to banks and credit 
unions.77 Consumers who own their car but do not have strong credit histories can 
turn their car titles into collateral for a loan, for instance, when they face a liquidity 
crisis.78 While almost completely unrecognized in legal academic literature, gold 
buyers offer another alternative to traditional banks and fringe credit providers. 
The economic distress from the Great Recession and skyrocketing gold prices 
created a perfect environment for gold buyers to thrive.79 To understand the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
 77. See generally Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between 
Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361 (2011) (describing the business 
models of various fringe credit providers). 
 78. Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto-Title Lending, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012). 
 79. Deirdre Fernandes, Gold Is Losing Its Shine for Investors, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 19, 2014, 
8:38 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/12/20/gold-losing-its-shine-for 
-investors/4X531gUg8rb6f5JQrkglaJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/XH22-VDE8] (noting that 
the facts that gold hit $1900 an ounce in 2011 and that the economic was in financial crisis 
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economic growth of this industry under these conditions, consider just one  
company: Gold & Silver Buyers. This company’s revenue skyrocketed during the 
Great Recession, jumping from $132,065 in 2007 to $15.2 million in 2010.80 At one 
point, Gold & Silver Buyers was opening a store a week.81 Another company, 
Cash4Gold, was so successful that it secured Super Bowl commercial time for an 
advertisement with Ed McMahon and MC Hammer telling people to send in their 
gold records and gold commodes for cash.82 
Modern day gold buyers fill the role traditional jewelers used to play in recycling 
precious metals. Traditionally, merchants traveled to different jewelers to purchase 
their scrap gold to be refined and made into jewelry by a business that could 
accumulate enough scrap to create jewelry.83 Now, retail establishments offer to buy 
gold in person, or internet companies tell consumers to send in gold. These internet-
based businesses then send the consumer a check as payment, and the consumer can 
either cash it and complete the transaction or request the gold buyer return the gold.84 
State laws regulate the gold buying industry, but they are not in place to protect 
people selling gold. For instance, states have laws that require gold buyers to register 
with the state.85 These registration requirements, however, attempt to prevent thieves 
from unloading stolen gold.86 Similarly, some states require gold buyers to hold gold 
that they have purchased for a set period of time87 or to keep extensive records about 
                                                                                                                 
 
created a “gold fever”).  
 80. Andrew Shen, The Ten Fastest-Growing Companies in America, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 
23, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/inc-fastest-growing-companies-2011 
-9 [https://perma.cc/ERD2-RN4Q]. 
 81. Solid Gold Week for Largest Precious Metals Buyer in Texas, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 12, 
2011, https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110812005596/en/Solid-Gold-Week 
-Largest-Precious-Metals-Buyer [https://perma.cc/S2MY-4SRW]. 
 82. Cash4Gold, MC Hammer & Ed McMahon in Cash 4 Gold Ad, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31, 
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrNipeP4HvQ [https://perma.cc/9TMD-ED6M]. 
 83. R. ALLEN HARDY, THE JEWELRY REPAIR MANUAL 267 (1996). 
 84. As one example of this procedure, see CASH4GOLD, http://www.cash4gold.com 
[https://perma.cc/9S5T-U9QD]. 
 85. E.g., G.A. CODE ANN. § 43-37-2 (2016). 
 86. Brian Day, Police Issue Warning About Buying and Selling Gold, PASADENA STAR-
NEWS (Jan. 2, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.pasadenastarnews.com/2011/01/02/police 
-issue-warning-about-buying-and-selling-gold [https://perma.cc/B4EZ-5CVE] (last updated 
Aug. 29, 2017, 11:04 AM) (“‘The Pasadena Police Department would like to inform the public 
that buying gold is against the law unless you are licensed by the California Department of 
Justice,’ the statement said. In addition, police added, ‘Gold buyers are required by law to ask 
for identification from whoever they buy from and maintain a description of the items they are 
buying. This information is then reported to law enforcement.’ . . . The license required to sell 
gold is the same as that of other ‘second-hand dealers’ who deal in items with serial numbers 
such as computers, cell phones, iPods and video game systems.”). 
 87. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-4104(A) (2013) (“The dealer shall retain all precious 
metals or gems purchased for a minimum of 15 calendar days from the date on which a copy 
of the bill of sale is received by the chief law-enforcement officer of the locality in which the 
purchase is made. Until the expiration of this period, the dealer shall not sell, alter, or dispose 
of a purchased item in whole or in part, or remove it from the county, city, or town in which 
the purchase was made.”). 
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the transaction,88 but these requirements protect third parties who may have been 
victims of theft, not the party selling the gold. 
When people purchase gold from sellers (or act as consumer buyers), 
governments protect their rights. State authorities and the FTC89 pursued the 
company Goldline for “bait-and-switch tactics, fraud, and overcharging.”90 The only 
protection for sellers in a few states is a requirement that businesses post the price 
they will pay for gold and that businesses use approved scales.91 But, these sorts of 
provisions are few and far between. 
Yet, despite the absence of regulation, consumers selling their gold face 
significant risks. Indeed, the gold buying market is the exact opposite of the standard 
relationship between buyers and sellers. Here, sellers are weak, and buyers are 
strong. 
Consumers selling gold are often vulnerable to begin with. People who use fringe 
banking institutions akin to gold buyers are poorer, less educated, and have fewer 
options than mainstream consumers.92 Senior citizens are particularly at risk in gold 
transactions, according to the American Association of Retired Persons.93 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 142A (2010) (“Whoever is in the business of 
purchasing gold, silver or platinum shall enter in a book kept for that purpose a description of 
the item, quantity purchased, the purchase price and the name and address of the seller; 
provided that the purchase price of such item is at least fifty dollars. Any person who sells 
gold, silver or platinum shall be required to show to the buyer prior to said sale identification 
which includes a photograph of said seller. Said book shall at all times be open to the 
inspection of the chief of police of a city or town or of any other officer having similar duties 
or any officer authorized by either of them, or a state police officer. Whoever violates any 
provision of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or 
imprisonment of not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment.”).  
 89. Press Release, FTC, FTC Settlement Bans Precious Metal Marketers from Selling 
Investment Opportunities (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press 
-releases/2014/03/ftc-settlement-bans-precious-metal-marketers-selling-investment [https:// 
perma.cc/22PZ-JR8M].  
 90. James Ledbetter, Why Gold Buyers Are So Susceptible to Fraud, MARKETWATCH 
(July 28, 2017, 2:45 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-gold-buyers-are-so 
-susceptible-to-fraud-2017-06-13 [https://perma.cc/UH9L-8SSD].  
 91. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.733 subdiv. 7 (West 2011) (“Every precious metal 
dealer shall prominently post in a conspicuous place and in letters exceeding one inch in height 
the minimum prices per ounce or pennyweight that are currently being paid by the dealer for 
precious metals and a warning notice that unless otherwise informed, the prices offered are 
based on the meltdown value of the precious metal, rather than the value of the item in its 
existing form. Precious metal items shall be weighed in plain sight of the prospective seller on 
scales approved by the Division of Weights and Measures of the Department of Commerce in 
accordance with sections 239.011 and 239.09.”). 
 92. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LOAN FACTS AND THE CFPB’S IMPACT (2016), https:// 
www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/06/payday_loan_facts_and_the_cfpbs_impact.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KA7N-U4MS] (“Average borrowers earn about $30,000 per year, and 58 
percent have trouble meeting their monthly expenses.”). 
 93. Doug Shadel & Joe Eaton, The Golden Fleece, AARP (Aug./Sept. 2016), http:// 
www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-2016/gold-coin-investment-scams.html [https:// 
perma.cc/LGE7-FK8J].  
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One significant risk that consumers face is that gold buyers will radically 
underpay them for their gold. A series of N.Y.C. Department of Consumer Affairs 
inspections found that gold buyers engaged in false advertising, did not separate gold 
pieces when they weighed them, and did not test accurately for karat rate, resulting 
in undervaluing the gold they purchased.94 The “inspections found a range of prices, 
from $175 to $450, for the same pieces of jewelry which were independently 
appraised at $590.”95 A congressman proposing a federal law in 2010 for this market 
stated “that research by his office and by Consumer Reports showed that Cash4Gold 
paid only 11 percent to 29 percent of the actual value of valuables sent to them.”96 
The reason it is especially easy for gold buyers to take advantage of consumers in 
this market is that the items being sold “were not necessarily purchased in the first 
instance for investment value. Indeed, the consumer may have little idea how much 
the items were worth when they were purchased, or what they are worth at current 
market prices.”97  
A second risk is that gold buyers will not return the gold after sellers send it to 
them. In a class action in Florida, plaintiffs alleged that a gold buyer was failing to 
return gold that plaintiffs had only sent to it for a price quotation.98 In a twist to this 
direct fraud, some argue that gold buyers send offers slowly to sellers so that the 
seller has little time to reject the offer before the contract becomes effective. 
Cash4Gold, for instance, assumes the consumer has accepted the offer ten days after 
it is made,99 so an unscrupulous buyer could delay mailing the offer for several days 
to make it less likely the seller could object.100  
While gold buying is the exact opposite of the relationship assumed in modern 
contract law of strong sellers / weak buyers, not all instances of consumers acting as 
sellers follow this model. In the following two examples, both buyers and sellers are 
weak. The strong party is the platform that facilitates the transaction in the first place. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, Department of Consumer Affairs 
Commissioner Mintz Announces Results of Holiday Gold Buying Sweep: Undercover 
Investigations Reveal Deceptive Weighing Practices and Widely Variable Pricing Valuations 
(Dec. 22, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20150731005947/http://www.nyc.gov 
/html/dca/html/pr2011/pr_122211.shtml [https://perma.cc/YZU2-M7Q8]. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Colin Moynihan, The Charge: Not So Much Cash 4 that Gold, N.Y. TIMES: CITY 
ROOM (Jan. 19, 2010, 6:15 PM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/the-charge-
not-so-much-cash-4-that-gold [https://perma.cc/2YK9-BLTD]. 
 97. Guarantee of a Legitimate Deal Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 4501 Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. 5 (2010), 
http://consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/precious-metals-testimony-0510.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/99UN-VUFN] (statement of Charles Bell, Programs Director, Consumers 
Union). 
 98. Kirts v. Green Bullion Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 10-20312-CIV, 2010 WL 3184382 (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 3, 2010). 
 99. See CASH4GOLD, supra note 84. 
 100. Moynihan, supra note 96. 
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B. eBay 
While eBay’s existence is, of course, not news, little has been written about how 
eBay has transformed consumers into sellers in ways that traditional contract and 
consumer protection law did not anticipate. eBay is not alone in this space;101 indeed, 
there are tens of thousands of electronic marketplaces,102 but it is certainly the market 
giant. As of the end of 2016, eBay “had more than 167 million active buyers and 
over one billion live listings globally.”103 Eighty-four billion dollars in transactions 
closed in 2016 over eBay’s platforms.104 eBay is valued higher than retailers 
JCPenney, Kmart, and Sears combined.105 Yet, despite the substantial impact eBay 
has on the millions of individual sellers on eBay, academic work on eBay focuses 
primarily on buyers’ vulnerabilities106 or third parties’ vulnerabilities,107 not the risks 
that sellers face. In fact, commentary argues for expanding seller liability.108 
The laws discussed in Part I already protect eBay buyers. Even when the 
individuals selling goods on eBay are just people, buyers are protected by some of 
the UCC warranties as well as the powerful remedies present in state consumer 
protection statutes. In 2009, for instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court held its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. eBay is not the only online marketplace for goods. Etsy also allows individuals to sell 
goods, although the company is much smaller with around one million sellers, and it has been 
focused on handmade goods. Therese Poletti, Do Etsy’s Changes Risk Making It Like eBay?, 
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 3, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/do-etsys 
-changes-risk-making-it-like-ebay-2013-10-03 [https://perma.cc/V49A-ZPMK]. Depop is a 
popular and similar website aimed at younger people and less formal than eBay. Miles 
Brignall, It’s Part-eBay, Part-Instagram, but Is Depop Safe for Your Teenagers?, GUARDIAN 
(June 3, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/jun/03/depop-ebay 
-instagram-teenagers-buy-sell-risks-fraud [https://perma.cc/82T9-RUF5]. 
 102. Alina N. Chircu & Robert J. Kauffman, Digital Intermediation in Electronic 
Commerce – the eBay Model, in E-COMMERCE AND V-BUSINESS: BUSINESS MODELS FOR 
GLOBAL SUCCESS 45, 47 (Stuart Barnes & Brian Hunt eds., 2001).  
 103. EBAY, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2016), https://ebay.q4cdn.com/610426115 
/files/doc_financials/financials/2016/2016_ebay_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8X4 
-VAW4]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY 5 (2002). 
 106. See, e.g., Mary M. Calkins, Alexei Nikitkov & Vernon Richardson, Mineshafts on 
Treasure Island: A Relief Map of the eBay Fraud Landscape, 8 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 5 
(2007) (“This article surveys the current auction fraud landscape using eBay as a model, 
examining a number of the ‘mine shafts’ down which unwary users, particularly buyers, can 
fall . . . .”).  
 107. E.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Jason Nintrup, Antiquity Meets the Modern Age: 
eBay’s Potential Criminal Liability for Counterfeit and Stolen International Antiquity Sales, 
5 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 143, 144 (2014); Mark P. McKenna, Probabilistic 
Knowledge of Third-Party Trademark Infringement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10; Brandon 
Peene, Lux for Less: EBay’s Liability to Luxury Brands for the Sale of Counterfeit Goods, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1077 (2010). 
 108. See generally Alexander van Voorhees, Comment, Ebay Sellers and Article 2: Selling 
a Broader Merchant Concept, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1199 (2006) (arguing that the implied 
warranty of merchantability should apply to individual sellers who regularly sell goods on 
eBay). 
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consumer fraud statute applied against an individual seller in Real v. Radir Wheels, 
Inc.109 The court reasoned that the statute “prohibits certain acts performed by ‘any 
person,’ and the statutory definition of ‘person’ is sufficiently expansive to ensnare” 
a defendant who sold a car through an internet auction site.110 Similarly, the Texas 
Supreme Court thirty years ago applied Texas’s DTPA against individual sellers 
under the same theory that an individual is a person subject to the Act.111 Other courts 
have implied that they would impose liability under state consumer protection laws 
to an internet consumer seller if the facts demonstrated liability.112 
eBay itself purposefully does not offer substantial protections to sellers. In fact, it 
specifically eschews suggestions that it police transactions on its website: “Since its 
inception, eBay has attempted to distance itself from the actual transactions taking 
place on its website, which it contends are between the individual buyers and sellers, 
with eBay’s role strictly limited to providing a trading environment.”113 
Yet, consumer sellers face a wide variety of serious risks when selling on eBay. 
First, sellers face the risk that buyers will undermine their reputations unfairly. 
Numerous economic studies have demonstrated that reputation is essential for 
successful selling, and positive reputations mean higher sale prices.114 In one study, 
buyers were willing to pay 8.1% higher for the same goods sold by a high-reputation 
seller who was established than from a new seller.115 Buyers, however, have 
substantial power to harm sellers’ reputations by leaving negative feedback.116 Some 
buyers are unreasonable in assessing sellers’ performance, leading to the risk that a 
buyer could undermine a seller’s ability to sell.117 eBay community forums are full 
of sellers complaining about false reviews of their behavior.118 In addition to harming 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. 969 A.2d 1069, 1078 (N.J. 2009). 
 110. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 111. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. 1980). 
 112. See, e.g., Christensen v. Foozailov, No. 2:10-cv-314 CW, 2010 WL 4052180, at *3 
(D. Utah Oct. 14, 2010) (finding that eBay buyers had stated a claim under state consumer 
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jurisdiction); Fleming v. Murphy, No. W2006-00701-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2050930, at *6 
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2007) (applying a state consumer protection law to the sale of a car 
by an individual seller on eBay, although ultimately concluding the seller did not violate the 
statute). 
 113. Calkins et al., supra note 106, at 4. 
 114. See Luís Cabral & Ali Hortaçsu, The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from 
eBay, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 54, 54 (2010) (“We find that, when a seller first receives negative 
feedback, his weekly sales rate drops from a positive 5% to a negative 8% . . . .”); Daniel 
Houser & John Wooders, Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay, 15 J. 
ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 353, 353 (2006) (“Our main empirical result is that seller’s, but not 
bidder’s, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.”).  
 115. Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser, John Swanson & Kate Lockwood, The Value of 
Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 79 (2006).   
 116. Id. 
 117. CLIFFORD R. ENNICO, THE EBAY SELLER’S TAX AND LEGAL ANSWER BOOK 155−56 
(2007). 
 118. E.g., musicalduet, Buyer Left Me False Feedback About Item Being Fake, Which It Is 
Not. It’s 100% Authentic, EBAY: EBAY COMMUNITY (Oct. 6, 2015, 7:34 PM), 
https://community.ebay.com/t5/Archive-Selling/Buyer-left-me-false-feedback-about-item 
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a seller’s ability to sell at an optimal price, false, negative reviews may result in eBay 
withholding benefits to sellers119 or in eBay preventing sellers from using eBay at 
all.120 Of particular concern here, negative reviews affect sellers with few 
transactions (i.e., consumer sellers) more than sellers with many sales.121 In addition, 
review systems with anonymous comments can facilitate racial bias.122 
Second, in addition to suffering because of false negative reviews, sellers can 
encounter trouble when buyers unjustifiably return goods under eBay’s generous 
return policies. eBay assures buyers with the eBay Money Back Guarantee: “To 
ensure all of our members have a great experience on eBay, most purchases are 
covered under eBay Money Back Guarantee. eBay Money Back Guarantee means 
you’re protected if the item you ordered didn’t arrive, is faulty or damaged, or doesn’t 
match the listing. You’ll get your money back.”123 If a buyer claims that the item 
does not match the seller’s description, eBay makes a determination whether the 
seller must refund the buyer’s money.124  
Problems arise, however, when buyers make questionable or fraudulent return 
claims: 
                                                                                                                 
 
-being-fake-which-it-is/td-p/24584832 [https://perma.cc/LTQ5-CGQ2] (“So, buyer gets it in 
the mail and, never even giving me the courtesy of his dissatisfaction by contacting me first, 
he immediately leaves me FALSE, negative feedback saying it’s not a Carhartt! I was shocked! 
He tarnished my 100% perfect rating with a LIE! How can these buyers get away with making 
a completely false accusation, and ebay won’t remove the comment?”). 
 119. Ben Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Balances of Power on eBay: Peers or Unequals? 2 
(May 26, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://groups.ischool.berkeley.edu 
/archive/p2pecon/papers/s2-gross-old.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XXY-ZDB5]. 
 120. Aron Hsiao, Top Ten Risks eBay Sellers Face, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Sept. 9, 2017), 
https://www.thebalance.com/top-ten-risks-ebay-sellers-face-1140349 
[https://perma.cc/3MDN-3K65] (noting that poor reviews are “a particular problem for eBay 
sellers not just because they’re inconvenient, embarrassing, or affect cash flow, but because 
they can actually lead to the effective inability to carry on day-to-day business. Both eBay and 
PayPal are known . . . for locking or suspending accounts that see poor feedback”). 
 121. Gross & Acquisti, supra note 119, at 3. 
 122. See Nancy Leong, The Sharing Economy Has a Race Problem, SALON (Nov. 2, 2014, 
4:58 PM), http://www.salon.com/2014/11/02/the_sharing_economy_has_a_race_problem 
[https://perma.cc/2S68-D75X] (“Although of course rating systems are not intended to express 
implicit bias, the research I’ve mentioned suggests that they may indeed do so by providing 
an avenue for individual sharing economy participants to express implicit bias. The rating 
system then aggregates these individual biased scores, resulting in a composite score reflecting 
the net effect of many biased ratings. And negative ratings can become self-perpetuating. If a 
passenger sees that an Uber driver has a low rating, the passenger may be primed to view the 
driver negatively. Such priming may lead to interpreting ambiguous conduct more negatively, 
and, ultimately, to more negative ratings. The result is a vicious cycle of self-reinforcing 
bias.”). 
 123. eBay Money Back Guarantee Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies 
/money-back-guarantee.html [https://perma.cc/L4X4-BJNR]. 
 124. User Agreement, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html 
[https://perma.cc/SJF3-RD7X] (“You agree to comply with the policy and permit us to make 
a final decision on any eBay Money Back Guarantee case.”). 
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Fraudulent credit card “chargebacks” present the most difficult risk for 
online sellers. . . . The risk of fraudulent credit card chargebacks is 
somewhat mitigated by Paypal’s “Seller Protection Policy,” which 
provides up to $5,000 of coverage for transactions Paypal deems 
fraudulent, as long as the transaction meets a number of requirements. 
Credit card companies also sometimes provide sellers forms of 
protection against fraudulent chargebacks. However, these protections 
appear to have numerous restrictions and loopholes; in particular, the 
Paypal User Agreement states that its Seller Protection Policy does not 
cover sellers for buyers’ claims that an item was received, but was 
“Significantly Not as Described.”125 
In disputes over returns, sellers report that eBay favors buyers in these disputes, 
often without investigating the underlying facts.126 If eBay sides with the buyer, the 
seller risks losing the item and the money, and facing debt collections efforts if the 
seller is unable to pay.127 In order to keep buyers spending money on eBay, eBay has 
been open that it favors buyers.128 This policy leaves many sellers losing because of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Calkins et al., supra note 106, at 14−15 (footnotes omitted). 
 126. Sophie Smith, The Four Pitfalls of Buying and Selling on eBay, TELEGRAPH (June 19, 
2018, 9:50 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/money-saving 
-tips/11644187/The-four-pitfalls-of-buying-and-selling-on-eBay.html [https://perma.cc/EF5J 
-FMKQ]; Anna Tims, Ebay Accused of Failing Its Sellers as Fraudulent Buyers Manipulate 
the System, GUARDIAN (May 21, 2017, 1:59 AM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/money/2017/may/21/ebay-accused-failing-sellers-buyers-manipulate-system-protection 
[https://perma.cc/Y5NE-G2NP] (“[One seller] plans to start a lobby group of disaffected 
sellers to challenge what he sees as bias against sellers. ‘My experience, and that of other 
sellers I have spoken to, is that buyer-fraud of this kind is rife,’ he says. ‘Every single seller I 
spoke to had a tale to tell of at least two incidents in the past year. The simple fact is the eBay 
policy allows this fraud.’”). 
 127. See Anna Tims, Ebay’s ‘No Quibbles’ Returns Policy Led to a Demand for £740 from 
a Debt Collection Agency, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2015, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/money/2015/jul/15/ebay-returns-policy-demand-debt-collector [https://perma.cc 
/WY96-DWKM] (“Ebay’s efforts to lure buyers with its no quibbles protection has proved a 
gift for scoundrels - my postbag sags with grief from sellers. Ebay denies that its dispute 
resolution system is automated, but the illogicality of many of its rulings suggests otherwise.”). 
 128. See Anna Tims, It’s Seller Beware as eBay’s Buyer Guarantee Is Exploited by 
Scammers, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2016, 4:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/money 
/2016/apr/25/ebay-seller-beware-buyer-guarantee-exploited-scammers [https://perma.cc 
/ZZ3C-D435] (“Ebay has always been candid about the fact that its apparent bias towards 
buyers is to keep them spending. For this reason, while buyers can leave negative feedback 
against a seller, sellers are only allowed to comment positively about buyers, in case, according 
to its website, ‘unfair feedback’ causes buyers to ‘decrease their shopping on eBay’. Sellers, 
meanwhile, are not allowed to know the identity of any comment writer so that ‘buyers feel 
comfortable about leaving feedback’. The seller’s only recourse, if a comment unjustifiably 
tarnishes their status, is to report a buyer privately to eBay and any negative comments are 
only removed if eBay receives multiple complaints about an individual.”). Jane Winn has 
made this same point in the context of Amazon and its third-party merchants: 
With regard to consumer transactions taking place within the Amazon 
Marketplace, Amazon both defines and enforces the norms that apply to third-
party merchants. In order to inspire consumer confidence, Amazon provides 
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the money back guarantee.129 eBay’s power as a platform allows it to externalize the 
costs of customer satisfaction onto the sellers by forcing sellers to accept 
unreasonable returns.130 
Third, sellers also face risks from eBay itself. eBay is a powerful company, 
especially in relation to individual sellers.131 The terms and agreements that sellers 
sign on with reflect this power imbalance.132 eBay sellers agree that they use the 
platform at their own risk, and they agree to not hold eBay liable “for any damages 
or losses (including, but not limited to, loss of money, goodwill or reputation, profits, 
other intangible losses, or any special, indirect, or consequential damages) resulting 
directly or indirectly from” a wide variety of things that could go wrong with the 
service.133 Even in situations where a seller could have a viable claim against eBay, 
eBay forces sellers to go to arbitration.134  
The starkest example of the power asymmetry is the process for amending the 
agreement. eBay can “amend this User Agreement at any time by posting the 
amended terms on www.eBay.com” and giving thirty-days’ notice.135 Sellers consent 
to the amendment by their “continued access or use of our Services.”136 In contrast, 
for a seller to amend the agreement, the seller must obtain “mutual agreement by you 
and an eBay representative who intends to amend this User Agreement and is duly 
authorized to agree to such an amendment.”137 
                                                                                                                 
 
Amazon Marketplace buyers with a comprehensive “A-to-Z Guarantee” that in 
effect forces third-party merchants to match its fanatical pursuit of customer 
satisfaction. The A-to-Z Guarantee provides refunds up to $2,500 for buyers who 
claim an item they received was damaged, defective, or materially different from 
the item represented on the product detail page. Refunds may also be provided 
for items that did not arrive within the delivery window, if the seller has not 
voluntarily issued the refund. Amazon can enforce its buyer guarantee policy by 
charging back refunds against the seller, or even excluding the seller from the 
Amazon Marketplace: “Sellers with excessive guarantee claims and/or service 
chargebacks may be subject to warnings, suspensions, and account termination.” 
Jane K. Winn, The Secession of the Successful: The Rise of Amazon as Private Global 
Consumer Protection Regulator, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 201 (2016) (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 129. Tims, supra note 128. 
 130. Winn, supra note 128, at 209. 
 131. See id. (noting that “the regulatory authority exercised by global platform operators 
may rival that of national governments”). 
 132. User Agreement, supra note 124. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (“You and eBay each agree that any and all disputes or claims that have arisen, or 
may arise, between you and eBay (including any disputes or claims between you and a third-
party agent of eBay) that relate in any way to or arise out of this or previous versions of the 
User Agreement, your use of or access to [eBay’s] Services, the actions of eBay or its agents, 
or any products or services sold, offered, or purchased through [eBay’s] Services shall be 
resolved exclusively through final and binding arbitration, rather than in court.”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, 
Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1630 (2017) (“While Uber drivers use the 
system, they may be offered a plethora of temporary contracts around price and other factors, 
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eBay’s ability to harm sellers is irrelevant unless there is a risk it will do so. 
Disgruntled sellers claim eBay has failed them, alleging poor responsiveness and 
customer service.138 Sellers also worry about “a shadowy set of rules and criteria” 
that eBay uses to generate search results and what sellers it includes on certain 
category pages.139 Because eBay has the ability to harm sellers, consumer sellers 
using eBay are exposed because of imbalanced power in the relationship.  
Finally, consumer sellers in disadvantaged groups face discrimination on eBay. 
Ian Ayres et al. recently conducted an experiment in which they auctioned baseball 
cards on eBay.140 Some of the cards were held by African Americans, while others 
were held by Caucasians.141 They found that “[c]ards held by African-American 
sellers sold for approximately 20% ($0.90) less than cards held by Caucasian 
sellers.”142 Other studies have reported similar results, with black sellers of iPods 
receiving “fewer and lower offers than white sellers,”143 and Arab sellers facing 
discrimination in the Israeli online market for used vehicles.144 
eBay’s and other similar companies’ presence in the relationship between buyers 
and sellers in online transactions both facilitates individuals acting as sellers and 
skews the legal arrangements to the sellers’ detriments. Unlike gold buying where 
the buyer is powerful, here, the company facilitating the transaction is powerful. In 
any case, the law has not adapted to recognize the risks sellers face. Consumer sellers 
in this space remain vulnerable.  
C. The Sharing Economy 
The final example of consumer sellers is perhaps the most economically 
significant—the sharing economy. In the sharing economy, web platforms connect 
individual buyers of services to individual sellers.145 Although a variety of services 
operate in the sharing economy, such as yoga instructors, tutors, and housekeepers, 
the most widely recognizable example is ridesharing. Companies like Uber and Lyft 
operate web platforms that enable individuals seeking rides to connect with drivers 
through a smartphone app.146 The drivers are not usually professional drivers with 
                                                                                                                 
 
and they are perennially forced to agree to new terms of service such as new commission 
structures, when they log in to work.”). 
 138. Smith, supra note 126. 
 139. Hsiao, supra note 120. 
 140. Ayres et al., supra note 27, at 891. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market 
Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. F496, F496 (2013). 
 144. Asaf Zussman, Ethnic Discrimination: Lessons from the Israeli Online Market for 
Used Cars, 123 ECON. J. F433 (2013).  
 145. Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1398 
(2016). There are a variety of sharing activities that do not fit within my definition here. 
Donald Kochan offers a more expansive view of sharing: “‘[S]haring’ means that the assets or 
services are allowed to be (often nonexclusively) used or consumed by someone other than 
the owner of the property or provider of the services.” Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore 
It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 928–29 (2017). 
 146. Alyssa M. Stokes, Note, Driving Courts Crazy: A Look at How Labor and 
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commercial licenses but are individuals with an available vehicle.147 As such, the 
buyers and sellers in transactions in the sharing economy have relatively similar 
levels of power,148 disrupting the strong seller / weak buyer paradigm of traditional 
law.  
Web platforms are important to this market because they dramatically decrease 
transaction costs.149 Specifically, web platforms match providers who have excess 
capacity for social use of their goods and buyers who need those goods or services.150 
In addition, web platforms create trust among buyers and sellers who are strangers 
because they have rating systems and consequences for malfeasance.151 
The growth of this market has been astounding. In 2014, the sharing economy 
generated $15 billion in revenue, but PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts it will 
generate $335 billion in 2025.152 As one notable example, just seven years after 
creating its first app, Uber is valued at close to $70 billion.153 Other parts of this 
market are similarly amazingly large, given the smallness of each individual seller.154 
The sharing economy’s appeal is largely attributed to the technology’s ability to 
lower transaction costs and utilize resources that have excess capacity.155 
The dominant legal debate over individuals selling services in the sharing 
economy is whether these individuals are employees of the platforms with which 
                                                                                                                 
 
Employment Laws Do Not Coincide with Ride Platforms in the Sharing Economy, 95 NEB. L. 
REV. 853, 854 (2017). 
 147. Nicholas L. DeBruyne, Note, Uber Drivers: A Disputed Employment Relationship in 
Light of the Sharing Economy, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 292 (2017). 
 148. See Vanessa Katz, Note, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1067, 1100–01 (2015) (“Moreover, sharing platforms standardize transactions such that 
providers no longer clearly occupy a superior bargaining position. . . . It is unclear how often 
providers actually negotiate with users. Even where these negotiations result in material 
changes to the contract, both parties occupy relatively even footing.”). 
 149. Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: 
How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293, 
297 (2016); Christopher Koopman, Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy 
and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 531 (2015). 
 150. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing 
as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 276 (2004). 
 151. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 147 (2016) (“At the same 
time, access, scale, repeat interactions, and technological identification combine to create a 
new system of stranger-oriented trust. The platform is introducing new forms of private 
regulation: reviews, ratings, and social network recommendations. These features can 
combine to provide alternatives to traditional regulation.”). 
 152. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE SHARING ECONOMY 14 (2014), https://www.pwc 
.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing 
-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS59-7WL9]. 
 153. Uber: From Zero to Seventy (Billion), ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2016, at 17. 
 154. See Kellen Zale, When Everything Is Small: The Regulatory Challenge of Scale in the 
Sharing Economy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 951 (2016) (“Airbnb has more listings for short-
term accommodation than the world’s largest hotel chains.”). 
 155. Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing 
Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 416–17 (2015). 
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they work or are independent contractors.156 Numerous lawsuits against web 
platforms argue that consumer sellers in the sharing economy are employees and not 
independent contractors.157 Given the focus on the employee/independent contractor 
distinction, why should we consider the sharing economy in the context of consumers 
as sellers? 
There are several compelling reasons for us to reconceptualize the debate about 
providers in the sharing economy as one about consumers’ rights as sellers. First, the 
employee designation does not always apply. Even if consumer sellers were 
considered employees when they were working with Uber, for instance, other 
consumer sellers would still lack protection. Kellen Zale explains the spectrum: 
The level of third-party platforms’ involvement in property-sharing 
activities varies. Some property-sharing activities––such as in informal 
backyard garden vegetable shares organized between neighbors via word 
of mouth––involve no third-party platforms. Other property-sharing 
activities, such as ride-sharing or short-term rentals conducted via 
Craigslist, involve third-party platforms, but their involvement is limited 
to serving as a virtual bulletin board. Finally, some third-party platforms, 
such as Airbnb and RelayRides, facilitate property-sharing transactions 
in numerous ways, such as through their membership requirements, trust 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. See, e.g., Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David, Platform Inequality: Gender in 
the Gig-Economy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 393, 397 (2017) (“Employment law scholarship 
has begun to pay attention to this phenomenon, focusing primarily on whether taskers should 
be classified as employees or independent contractors.”); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating 
Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 241 
(2015) (“In the legal realm, however, a disturbing dissonance exists between excitement over 
this seemingly new way of doing business and regulatory floundering. Is Airbnb a hotel chain, 
a rental agency, or a website provider? Is Uber a taxicab service employing hundreds of drivers 
or a developer of an app? These questions remain unanswered. Yet policy makers cannot 
regulate the sharing economy without answering them.”); Robert L. Redfearn III, Sharing 
Economy Misclassification: Employees and Independent Contractors in Transportation 
Network Companies, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1024 (2016) (“Among the most 
challenging legal issues presented by this societal shift is whether certain sharing platform 
workers should be classified as employees or independent contractors.”); Brishen Rogers, 
Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 479, 480 (2016) (“Worker advocates and others on the left accuse such companies of 
misclassifying their workers as independent contractors in order to avoid a host of employment 
law obligations . . . . The companies, in turn, typically deny that their workers are employees, 
casting themselves simply as technology firms . . . .”); DeBruyne, supra note 147, at 292 
(“Although Uber continues to stand as the world’s largest ride-sharing company in the 
transportation industry, the question of whether Uber drivers should be classified as employees 
or independent contractors remains unresolved.”). 
 157. E.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also 
Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers? 
Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619, 620 (2016) 
(“It is unsurprising, therefore, that courts and administrative bodies have begun to find 
themselves tasked with determining crowdworkers’ legal status . . . .”). 
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verification and ratings systems, and facilitation of payments between 
parties.158 
Thus, focusing exclusively on the employee/independent contractor question 
offers less potential to offer a comprehensive regulatory solution than recognizing 
consumers’ rights as sellers.159 
Second, protecting individuals serving in the sharing economy with traditional 
employees’ rights may not adequately protect them. Kate Andrias recently noted that 
the National Labor Relations Act is failing American workers.160 This failure is 
particularly acute in the sharing economy where the relationship between the 
platform and worker does not fall neatly within the employee or the independent 
contractor framework.161 
Finally, analyzing the sharing economy under traditional contract principles 
instead of just employment law models may aid policymakers who are struggling to 
keep up with changing technology. Agnieszka McPeak has demonstrated that 
traditional tort principles can inform the sharing economy: “Even though sharing-
economy companies challenge the status quo with their innovative and non-
traditional business approaches, pre-existing principles suffice to clarify tort liability 
in this new context.”162 Similarly, by thinking of individuals offering services as 
consumer sellers, regulators have a variety of time-tested principles to inform their 
approaches to regulating this novel market. 
The calls to regulate the sharing economy primarily focus on consumers as buyers 
or public safety.163 Governmental responses mirror these concerns for individual 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 564–65 (2016) (footnote 
omitted). 
 159. Aloni, supra note 145, at 1401 (criticizing scholarship on the sharing economy 
because it focuses on exclusively one part of the economy like ridesharing or short-term 
rentals). 
 160. Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 2 (2016). 
 161. Id. at 29; see also Rogers, supra note 156, at 481 (“In the Lyft case, Judge Vince 
Chhabria struck a nice metaphor: if the case reached a jury it would be ‘handed a square peg 
and asked to choose between two round holes.’ Lyft drivers are not classic independent 
contractors since they are actually at the core of Lyft’s business, and often work for the 
company for years. Yet they are not classic employees either.” (footnote omitted)). 
 162. Agnieszka A. McPeak, Sharing Tort Liability in the New Sharing Economy, 49 CONN. 
L. REV. 171, 171 (2016). 
 163. See, e.g., Katie Barglind, Note, Innovation, Technology, and Transportation: The 
Need to Address On-Demand Ridesharing and Modernize Outdated Taxi Regulations in the 
US, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 701, 712 (2016) (“Rideshare critics also argue that the on-demand 
services pose too great of a risk to society to be left unregulated. In short, legislators have 
justified stringent taxi regulations based on their concern for public safety and consumer 
protection.” (footnote omitted)); Katz, supra note 148, at 1078 (noting that relationships in the 
sharing economy are similar in many ways to “common law special relationships [that] assume 
that certain transactions pose unique health, safety, and financial concerns for consumers”); 
Hannah A. Posen, Note, Ridesharing in the Sharing Economy: Should Regulators Impose 
Über Regulations on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405, 408 (2015) (arguing “that the best way to 
protect consumers is to allow Uber to continue its operations, subject to experimental 
regulations directed at ensuring passenger safety”); Carl Shaffer, Note, Square Pegs Do Not 
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purchasers.164 For instance, the FTC offered guidance to the City of Chicago as it 
sought to regulate ridesharing. The FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of 
Competition, and Bureau of Economics argued that “any regulations directed at 
[ridesharing] services should focus primarily on ensuring the safety of customers and 
drivers, deterring deceptive practices relating to fares, safety and liability, and other 
terms of use, and addressing other consumer protection issues, especially data 
security and the prevention of identity theft.”165 The focus was entirely buyer 
centered. 
Yet, individuals selling services in the sharing economy face real risks. First, they 
may face discrimination based on their race or gender. Some academics have hoped 
that ridesharing would disrupt the discrimination that plagued taxi cabs by providing 
more information that participants could use to assess the trustworthiness of trading 
partners.166 Based on existing empirical evidence, however, this hope has not 
materialized. One empirical study of profiles of service providers in the sharing 
economy found that women “online taskers’ requested rates,” on average, were 37% 
lower than men offering the same services.167 Similarly, a study of data about 
Airbnb.com hosts revealed that black hosts charge around 12% less than nonblack 
hosts with similar rentals.168 Rating systems that are so important to establishing trust 
                                                                                                                 
 
Fit in Round Holes: The Case for a Third Worker Classification for the Sharing Economy and 
Transportation Network Company Drivers, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2017) (“Other 
detractors in traditional industries claim the lack of regulatory oversight on sharing economy 
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 164. See, e.g., Andrea Bolton, Comment, Regulating Ride-Share Apps: A Study on 
Tailored Reregulation Regarding Transportation Network Companies, Benefitting Both 
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Councilwoman Kim Rafferty who justified the city’s regulations on ridesharing because the 
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 165. Letter from Staff of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition & 




 166. See, e.g., Julia Y. Lee, Trust and Social Commerce, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 156–57 
(2015) (“[I]n conditions of high uncertainty, taxi drivers approach trust decisions through cues 
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 167. Barzilay & Ben-David, supra note 156, at 398. 
 168. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of 
Airbnb.com (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), https://www.hbs.edu 
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in the sharing economy seem to actually replicate the implicit biases in society at 
large.169 
Second, they face risks dealing with the web platform that facilitates the 
transactions. The web platform is often the most powerful participant in the 
transaction.170 Many of the transactions in the sharing economy are not part of a free 
market because sometimes the platform sets the prices, leaving sellers at the mercy 
of an incredibly powerful party.171 The platform takes a large part of the fee that the 
buyer pays the seller.172 The FTC has alleged that Uber engaged in deceptive acts 
relating to pay against its drivers,173 demonstrating the risk individual sellers face 
relating to the web platform they use. Even in the absence of deception, web 
platforms control the contracts with individual sellers through retaining a right to 
unilaterally alter the contract.174 Moreover, as in the case of eBay, in the sharing 
economy, the platform often prioritizes the buyer over the seller because the buyer 
is more important to the platform’s bottom line.175 In traditional consumer law, the 
law protects weak buyers when dealing with merchants. The sharing economy injects 
a powerful third party into that relationship, suggesting the need to protect consumer 
sellers. 
Third, they face risks to personal safety. Uber drivers are sometimes attacked; 
people renting out a room in their home with Airbnb could experience violence. 
Currently, platforms in the sharing economy do little to train participants or protect 
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them: “Drivers get a few tips on how to look out for themselves, but these are easily 
overlooked or soon forgotten in the haste to get more drivers on the road.”176  
Finally, consumer sellers face risks of legal liability. This liability can be in the 
form of governmental fines, such as one Airbnb participant who faced a $40,000 fine 
for renting out an apartment.177 In addition to fines, consumer sellers might face 
eviction or penalties from their landlords or homeowner associations.178 Indeed, 
some posit that Airbnb avoids informing individual participants on the risks they face 
from engaging in short-term leases.179 
The other legal liability comes in the risk of gaps in insurance coverage. In 2013, 
an Uber driver killed a girl while the driver was on his way to pick up a passenger.180 
Uber initially refused to pay because the driver was not actively carrying a 
passenger.181 The situation generated a potential gap in the driver’s insurance. Uber’s 
policy might not cover the claim because the driver was not actively engaged in 
driving a customer, but the driver’s individual insurance may not pay the claim 
because it excluded claims if the driver was operating the vehicle for a commercial 
purpose.182 Uber has tried to respond by increasing the insurance it provides for 
drivers, but some commentators think gaps remain,183 and some scholarship argues 
that Uber has misrepresented the insurance coverage available to drivers.184 Indeed, 
Uber has refused to operate in jurisdictions that require full-time commercial 
insurance for Uber drivers.185 
One might respond to my argument that we should treat providers in the sharing 
economy as sellers by contending that these providers really are buyers—they 
purchase the services that the platform sells. An important article by Ryan Calo and 
Alex Rosenblat recently suggests just that. They argue that consumer law could help 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Molly McHugh, Uber and Lyft Drivers Work Dangerous Jobs—But They’re on Their 
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 179. See id. (citing sources). 
 180. Tad Delin & Stacey Chiu, Insuring the Sharing Economy: Existing Models, New 
Models, Traps and Mitigation of Gaps, in SHARING ECONOMY 100:100, Westlaw (last updated 
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Misleading UberX Drivers About Their Insurance Coverage, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1097, 1098–99 
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insurance industry experts believe that uberX drivers still face coverage gaps while they drive 
around searching for fares. Indeed some uberX drivers involved in accidents have 
unexpectedly found themselves without the benefit of Uber’s auto insurance.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 185. See Bolton, supra note 164, at 148 (“Although Uber provides a commercial insurance 
policy of up to $1 million for drivers while carrying passengers, this would not meet the 
requirements of the ordinance. Requiring each driver to carry his or her own policy would be 
‘prohibitively expensive.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
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protect participants in the sharing economy.186 Following the FTC in its complaint 
against Uber, they call sharing economy providers “entrepreneurial consumers.”187 
Individuals offering rides or space in their home are consumers because they make 
purchases from Uber or Airbnb, just like multilevel marketing participants bought 
goods from Amway and then sold them.188 Consumer law, they contend, has failed 
because its interventions in the sharing economy have been “outdated and 
superficial” in protecting individual buyers in their relationships with their 
platforms.189  
Though admirable in what it would do to protect people buying services, I do not 
think that Calo and Rosenblat’s prescription for using consumer law in the sharing 
economy will ultimately protect the selling participants in the sharing economy. 
First, not all of the risks consumer sellers face in the sharing economy relate to the 
platform they use. Some risks come directly from buyers, such as risks of 
discrimination, personal harm, and legal liability. Unless consumer law evolves to 
protect consumers as sellers, consumer sellers in the sharing economy remain in 
harm’s way. Second, a lot of traditional consumer protection laws will not apply to 
individuals interacting with platforms if the individuals are not acting for personal, 
family, or household purposes. If they are acting as small businesses, many state laws 
will not protect them. Without changing the definition of consumer to allow for 
profit-generating activities, a lot of traditional consumer law will offer little help to 
sellers in the sharing economy. 
Thus, consumers as sellers face serious risks in the sharing economy. Despite 
these risks, scholars and lawmakers have primarily focused either on forcing sellers 
into the category of employees or on protecting buyers in the sharing economy. As 
the following Part argues, policymakers should adopt stronger protections for 
consumers acting as sellers in the sharing economy and in other marketplaces. 
III. PROTECTING CONSUMERS AS SELLERS 
Because it was formulated in a world in which consumers were almost exclusively 
buyers, contract law and consumer protection law primarily protect buyers. This Part 
makes the argument for why policymakers should extend protections to consumer 
sellers, and it offers suggestions for how to best protect consumer sellers. 
A. Justifying New Laws for New Consumers 
The mere fact that consumers have taken on the role of sellers in many 
transactions today does not itself justify extending protections to consumer sellers. 
Yet, many of the rationales behind laws that protect consumer buyers apply equally 
to consumer sellers. This Section offers three bases for protecting consumer sellers: 
(1) power asymmetries; (2) information asymmetries; and (3) smallness. It concludes 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 137, at 1624. 
 187. Id. at 1679. 
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platform. See id. at 1686. 
 189. Id. at 1624. 
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by responding to potential counterarguments one might raise to special protections 
for consumer sellers. 
1. Consumer sellers often encounter power asymmetries with trading partners that 
justify legal protections. 
In an ideal world, contracting parties “meet each other on a footing of social and 
approximate economic equality.”190 But, often the relationship is imbalanced, and 
the law adjusts transactions accordingly. Contract law and consumer protection law 
reflect the model of a strong seller and weak buyer, and they protect the buyer 
because of this disparity in power. For instance, implied warranties for new homes191 
and leases192 exist because consumer buyers have less bargaining power than sellers. 
Similarly, courts and scholars attack standard form contracts because of the relative 
power of the parties entering into them.193 
When consumers are sellers, this same power asymmetry occurs. Gold buyers are 
almost always large, sophisticated businesses, and consumer sellers are often normal 
people who are desperate for cash.194 While the buyers in the sharing economy and 
on eBay may be other consumers, the platforms that consumer sellers interact with 
are large companies.195 As Part II demonstrated, the strong buyer/platforms in these 
relationships often use their bargaining power to extract unfavorable and potentially 
unfair terms, such as lopsided pricing schemes, arbitration agreements, and contract 
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nonwaivable warranties into contract law.”); Todd D. Ruggiero, Casenote, Brown v. Green 
and Hadian v. Schwartz: Determining Who Is Responsible for Major Structural Repairs in 
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 193. Becher, supra note 13, at 725. 
 194. See supra text accompanying notes 80–82, 92–93. 
 195. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
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amendment procedures. Because employment laws often fail to protect sellers in 
these markets, “companies are free to impose increasingly substantial requirements 
on suppliers and to market these requirements as part of their brands while leaving 
suppliers to internalize the risks associated with transactions.”196 Thus, not only do 
consumer sellers face power asymmetries, they suffer because of them.197 Just like 
the law protects consumer buyers who are weaker than their trading partners, the law 
should protect consumer sellers. 
2. Consumer sellers experience information asymmetries with trading  
partners that warrant regulatory intervention. 
When parties to a contract have vastly different amounts of information, the law 
will sometimes intervene to mitigate unfair bargains.198 For instance, courts will use 
information asymmetries to justify using unconscionability as a defense to enforcing 
a contract.199  
Even where the law does not reform deals after the fact, it often makes demands 
of the party with more information. Disclosures protect buyers from information 
asymmetries.200 The UCC’s warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is premised 
on the seller having superior knowledge.201 Indeed, an essential justification for 
treating consumer transactions different than merchant transactions is the lack of 
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knowledge many consumers have.202 Consumer protection statutes also protect 
buyers because they lack information.203  
Information asymmetries result in inefficient transactions or may even cause 
market failure,204 so policymakers can use imbalances in information to justify 
regulatory intervention. Also, disparate amounts of information can lead to fraud.205 
Usually the seller has more information than the buyer.206 But, when consumers 
are sellers, the standard paradigm is flipped. The buyer or a platform that facilitates 
the transaction often has more information than the seller. Uber, for instance, has 
more information about the dangers drivers face than the individual drivers. Gold 
buyers have much more information about the quality of gold a seller presents as 
well as the price points for those types of gold. 
It makes sense that merchant buyers and large platforms would have more 
information than individual sellers because these businesses engage in the same types 
of transactions repeatedly and are able to learn from each transaction and amortize 
the cost of obtaining information over these transactions.207 Gold sellers, on the other 
hand, may only sell once. Businesses are less prone to suffer from behavioral biases 
than individuals who systematically make suboptimal decisions because of irrational 
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biases.208 Finally, businesses have resources to hire lawyers and experts to inform 
their decision-making while consumer sellers do not.209 
Thus, just as the law protects consumer buyers who lack adequate information to 
protect their interests, courts and legislatures should intervene to protect consumer 
sellers when their trading partners have pronounced informational advantages over 
them. 
3. Consumer sellers’ small scale justifies protection. 
A third justification for protecting consumer sellers is that consumer sellers 
operate on such a small scale that they cannot efficiently protect themselves. A major 
function of private contracts or regulations is to allocate risk between parties based 
on which party is better at dealing with the risk.210 In markets where two parties have 
different costs for bearing risk, contracts allocate the risk to the party which can bear 
it with the least expense.211 The trick in allocating risk between private parties is to 
allocate the risk to the party which is risk neutral and not to the party which is risk 
averse.212 In a market with perfect information, a risk-averse party will happily pay 
a risk-neutral party to bear risk.213 If private contracts cannot allocate risks because 
of market failure,214 the law should put the risk on the party that can bear it with the 
least expense.215 
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When businesses are sellers, they often are in the best position to avoid costs from 
risks because they have superior information to the buyer.216 Also, they are better 
positioned to bear risks because they can spread the cost of the risk over numerous 
other deals.217 As Charles Corker explains in the context of liability for check fraud, 
large entities have the capacity to get insurance or self-insure against losses: “Banks 
can insure, although if their volume of checks is sufficiently large they may choose 
to act as self-insurers against smaller losses, since forgery losses out of a large 
volume of checks handled should be relatively predictable.”218  
                                                                                                                 
 
in such terms. A statement of this kind is generally followed by an additional one which 
implies that the enterprise can pass the loss on to the consumers in price rises, and that 
therefore enterprise liability is really a form of ‘risk spreading.’” (footnote omitted)); Clayton 
P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181, 184 
(1996) (“Where multiple parties (i.e., either customers or financial institutions) could take 
such precautions, regulations should, therefore, place the obligation on the party who can 
avoid the loss at the lowest cost.”). 
 216. As Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed famously suggested, some situations 
justify “putting costs on the party or activity which can most cheaply avoid them.” Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096–97 (1972). Kabir Masson explains how 
this works in the context of sellers and warranties:  
Seller warranties . . . might also create a more efficient cost allocation. In this 
example the reallocation of risk can change the cost structure of the deal. Sally 
may receive a higher price for her car by taking on this extra risk through the 
warranty, as long as Bob is willing to pay Sally to take this risk. This is most 
likely to occur when it is less expensive for sellers to assume the risk than for 
buyers. For example, perhaps the seller has superior knowledge about the 
accuracy of the warranty, or perhaps the seller is better positioned to spread the 
costs related to defective products.  
Kabir Masson, Note, Paradox of Presumptions: Seller Warranties and Reliance Waivers in 
Commercial Contracts, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 508 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
 217. Garvin, supra note 8, at 304–05 (“The consumer also lacks the merchant’s ability to 
spread risk cost-effectively. In particular, self-insurance is not nearly as good an option for an 
individual as for a business. With fewer transactions, the consumer cannot assume that routine 
fluctuations will average smoothly. With fewer assets, the consumer cannot assume that she 
will be able to weather an unusually bad bit of luck. Consumers can and do buy third-party 
insurance, as do businesses, but even then, the types of insurance and their costs vary greatly. 
Some consumers are able to contract on favorable terms because their employers or their 
unions provide the bargaining power, and some get subsidized insurance of some types, mainly 
for personal injury. For economic loss or property loss, however, subsidies are relatively rare, 
and businesses may be able to secure superior rates.” (footnote omitted)); van Voorhees, supra 
note 108, at 1213 (“A final rationale for limiting the implied warranty of merchantability to 
dealers is that a dealer, more than a buyer, is generally a superior loss bearer and endowed 
with more information and control of the product.”).  
 218. Charles E. Corker, Risk of Loss from Forged Indorsements: A California Problem, 4 
STAN. L. REV. 24, 31 (1951); see also Note, Forged Government Checks: Misallocation of 
Loss by the Federal Common Law, 66 YALE L.J. 1107, 1118 (1957) (“But the unique position 
of the government as a risk-distributor justifies its bearing the risk of loss where private parties 
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Consumer sellers, on the other hand, do not have superior information, as 
discussed above, so they are unlikely to be the least cost avoider. Also, they often 
engage in few transactions, so they cannot spread the costs of risk by self-insuring 
against losses. Getting insurance from another party is virtually impossible because 
the bargaining costs for such insurance would be too high and the number of losses 
too low to make the insurance cost effective.219 Uber drivers’ troubles with insurance 
are symptomatic of this inability to accommodate risk. Consumer sellers, unlike 
businesses, are simply too small to protect themselves effectively, justifying 
lawmakers to step in to protect them and to impose risks on larger companies. 
4. Potential Counterarguments 
I have argued that consumer sellers’ inferior information and power and their 
small size all should compel regulatory intervention, but one might imagine several 
compelling counterarguments to my suggestion that lawmakers protect consumer 
sellers. First, there is a long-standing opposition to creating a different law for 
consumers and merchants. In arguing against the UCC when it was first proposed, 
Samuel Williston noted:  
There is no such separation in the law of England or in that of the United 
States. The effect of a transaction depends upon the nature of the facts, 
not on the persons, unless they are bound by a special usage or custom 
. . . . There are no uniform usages as to all merchants throughout the 
United States. Nor do the particular provisions in regard to merchants 
bring the Code into harmony with the commercial codes of civil law 
countries. If a farmer or a school teacher engages in buying or selling 
goods or otherwise deals in mercantile transactions, he is, under the 
present law, and should continue to be, entitled to the same rights and 
subject to the same duties as if he were a merchant.220 
Historically, of course, Williston lost this battle, and the UCC emerged with 
disparate treatments for merchants and consumers. While contract law is general and 
the UCC did make law much more uniform, there are still “many areas within 
contract [that] have their own special rules, and in those a close look at particular 
relations among consumers, small businesses, and large businesses may prove 
fruitful, and indeed already have.”221 Unique contexts require unique laws,222 so fear 
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of deviating from uniform laws should not deter lawmakers from protecting 
consumer sellers. 
A second important argument against my suggestion is that enhancing consumer 
sellers’ protections will necessarily diminish buyers’ protections in these markets.223 
In the sharing economy, for instance, people are very concerned about buyers’ 
rights.224  
The problem with this argument, however, is that the policies I suggest below 
would primarily operate against large businesses, not individual buyers. The ways 
that courts protect buyers, for instance through unconscionability, depend on sellers 
being strong and buyers being weak. If a parallel rule applied in favor of consumer 
sellers, the only effect would be to limit powerful companies’ rights, not individual 
buyers. 
And, even if the effect of considering protecting consumer sellers is to limit 
consumer buyers’ protections, there is nothing that automatically suggests we always 
prefer buyers to sellers. Without implementing the policies I suggest, the default is 
to protect buyers at the cost of sellers. If nothing else, the Article hopes to 
problematize defaulting to protecting only the buyer. 
A final argument is linguistic in nature. Consumers, one might posit, by definition 
consume, so we cannot conceive of consumers as sellers because sellers only receive 
money and never consume goods or services. This argument is certainly appealing, 
but it is not necessary. Current law, as discussed above, generally defines consumers 
based on their entity status as individuals, not on their activity of consumption.225 
Moreover, in many consumer protection statutes, individuals currently labeled 
consumers are not explicitly consuming anything. For instance, the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act governs how credit bureaus present credit worthiness information 
about people.226 These laws affect individuals even if the individuals do not order 
credit reports or consume the information. Similarly, debt collection laws protect 
people based on past debts, and consumers do not need to consume anything new to 
qualify for protection.227 Thus, while it may seem intuitively strange to include 
sellers within the category of consumers, current law opens the door to this idea. The 
next Section suggests that lawmakers walk through that door and create an explicit 
category of consumer sellers. 
B. Proposing New Laws 
Having argued for why we need to protect consumer sellers, I offer here several 
policies that lawmakers should consider as they adapt laws to these changed 
circumstances. The first suggestion is broad and theoretical. The rest are practical 
policies judges or legislatures could implement by altering or amending current law.  
                                                                                                                 
 
instead of general contract principles to govern title lending transactions). 
 223. I appreciate Kellen Zale pointing this argument out to me. 
 224. See supra note 163. 
 225. See supra notes 163–65. 
 226. Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 
2088 (1996). 
 227. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a–1692p (2012). 
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1. Creating a category for consumer sellers. 
Having unearthed a variety of situations in which sellers are consumers, I first 
suggest that academics and lawmakers establish a legal category of consumer sellers. 
In many federal and state consumer protection laws, buyers can qualify as consumers 
if they are acting primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.228 Sellers 
should have a similar potential to fall within the category of consumer sellers, 
although the definition would have to change to reflect that the consumer is selling a 
good or service and would not qualify as a merchant of those goods or services. Thus, 
a consumer seller could mean “a natural person who is not a merchant and sells goods 
or services primarily for personal, family, or household income.” 
On a theoretical level, if we reconceptualize sellers as consumers, many of the 
arguments in the consumer protection literature for consumer buyers could 
potentially extend to consumer sellers. For instance, consumer advocates have for 
years argued against forced predispute arbitration clauses.229 These clauses prevent 
individuals from suing in court, are part of contracts of adhesion,230 and most 
importantly, prevent individuals from suing as a class.231 Without the right to 
organize as a class, many individuals cannot obtain redress because suing as one 
person is too expensive.232 In the sharing economy, mandatory arbitration clauses 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (defining “debt” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act to mean “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of 
a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the 
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such 
obligation has been reduced to judgment”). 
 229. E.g., Alex Brunino, Comment, A Modest Proposal: Review of the National Consumer 
Law Center’s Model State Consumer and Employee Justice Enforcement Act, 95 OR. L. REV. 
569, 580 (2017).  
 230. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 1648–49 (2005) (“[C]ritics urge that the nonconsensual nature of mandatory consumer 
arbitration is itself a problem per se. Empirical studies have shown that only a minute 
percentage of consumers read form agreements, and of these, only a smaller number 
understand what they read. Some companies may even deliberately design their arbitration 
clauses in a manner geared to decrease the likelihood that the consumer will focus on the 
arbitration clause. Moreover, even to the extent that consumers might read and understand an 
arbitration clause imposed on a predispute basis, psychologists have shown that predictable 
irrationality biases will prevent them from properly evaluating the costs and benefits of 
accepting such a clause. For example, because people tend to be overly optimistic, they will 
often underpredict the need they might have to bring a claim against a company and thus 
undervalue what they are losing by giving up a right to sue.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 231. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 75, 75–76 (2004) (“Companies are increasingly drafting arbitration clauses worded to 
prevent consumers from bringing class actions against them in either litigation or arbitration. 
If one looks at the form contracts she receives regarding her credit card, cellular phone, land 
phone, insurance policies, mortgage, and so forth, most likely, the majority of those contracts 
include arbitration clauses, and many of those include prohibitions on class actions. 
Companies are seeking to use these clauses to shield themselves from class action liability, 
either in court or in arbitration.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 232. Developments in the Law––Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1170–81 
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have prevented individuals from obtaining relief for racial discrimination.233 
Consumer law scholars have offered a wide variety of reform proposals to ensure 
buyers have the ability to vindicate their rights, such as prohibiting class action 
waivers in mandatory arbitration clauses.234 Again, however, these arguments are for 
consumer buyers, not sellers.235 If individual sellers are “consumers,” however, these 
arguments suddenly apply to consumer sellers, and legislatures can react accordingly 
by passing laws to protect all consumers—buyers and sellers. 
Also, on a more practical level, as courts consider the applicability of contract 
defenses, understanding that some sellers are consumers could prompt courts to 
apply defenses in those cases where they would automatically reject the defense 
coming from a company.236 Larry Garvin explains how a party’s consumer status 
causes courts to relax contract doctrines: 
                                                                                                                 
 
(2009) (“Class action waivers pertaining to consumer-plaintiff actions seem to stem from 
illegitimate motives insofar as they raise the average litigation cost for an individual case and 
consequently render such cases negative-value. The problem with consumer-plaintiff 
arbitrations, then, is that they essentially never occur.” (footnote omitted)). 
 233. Caitlin Toto, Sharing Economy Inequality: How the Adoption of Class Action Waivers 
in the Sharing Economy Presents a Threat to Racial Discrimination Claims, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
1355, 1355 (2017) (“Victims of discrimination, however, have encountered an even greater 
opponent: class action waivers in arbitration agreements, which are omnipresent in sharing 
economy company contracts.”). 
 234. For a discussion of different reform proposals, see Miles B. Farmer, Note, Mandatory 
and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2360–61 (2012) 
(“Many different proposals for reforming mandatory arbitration have been put forward. Some 
commentators want to ban mandatory arbitration entirely in cases of unequal bargaining 
power. Others seek to offer additional mechanisms for judicial review that could protect 
against biased or unethical proceedings.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 235. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 414 (2005) (“The contractual 
relation is obvious in most cases: for example, cellular-phone service subscribers, mortgagees, 
and credit card holders receive actual, old-fashioned contracts which may contain the 
collective action waiver. It is less obvious that a consumer who buys a computer in a box (or 
a toothbrush, or plane ticket) may have engaged in a transaction effecting the waiver of her 
right to participate in a class action or sue in court. And yet, under current doctrine, there is 
little question that ordinary retail purchases of goods—whether in-store or by telephone or 
internet—may support the imposition of an arbitration clause and collective action waiver.” 
(footnote omitted)); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1231 (2003) (“The second type causes buyers to 
waive traditional means of legal redress, such as mandatory arbitration provisions and forum 
selection clauses.”); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts 
Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 332 
n.14 (2009) (“I interpret the specification of a particular forum or 
a mandatory arbitration provision as generically less buyer friendly . . . .”). 
 236. Garvin, supra note 8, at 381 (“The courts routinely state that businesses normally will 
not be able to invoke [unconscionability] successfully, as they will have too much market 
power and sophistication to warrant its use. On the other hand, the courts have sometimes 
allowed small businesses to invoke unconscionability where the owners were especially ill-
educated or ill-informed, where their market power was especially weak, where the acts of the 
other party were especially misleading, and the like.” (footnote omitted)). 
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The contract defenses are particularly good examples. Many of them 
invoke questions of resources, information, and cognition, just as 
consumer law does. Very often, common-law courts refuse to apply these 
doctrines to businesses, or apply them only in the most extraordinary 
cases. . . . Even doctrines like the parol-evidence rule are at times relaxed 
when there are pronounced disparities between the parties. Contract 
interpretation also is not immune; construing a contract against its drafter 
normally favors the smaller contracting party over the larger. The courts 
do at times refer to inequality of bargaining power as their shibboleth.237  
If we create a legal category of consumer sellers, these defenses meant to mitigate 
power imbalances could more readily apply to them. 
2. Eliminating intent from causes of action based on deception. 
While the idea of creating a conceptual category for consumer sellers is more 
theoretical in nature, one practical solution policymakers could immediately 
implement is eliminating intent from causes of action based on a buyer deceiving a 
consumer seller. One of the most important advances for consumer buyers has been 
relaxing the requirements for proving common law fraud.238 Intent is notoriously 
costly to prove, so having an intent element in a consumer seller’s cause of action 
for deception will squelch lawsuits before they have a chance to reveal illicit conduct.  
There are costs to businesses to expanding liability for unintentional deceptive 
conduct, but businesses are the appropriate party to bear those costs, not consumer 
sellers. Even in cases where businesses do not intend to deceive consumers, 
consumers are harmed by misrepresentations, so some party has to pay. Businesses 
are more likely to be able to effectively spread the cost of liability across their other 
transactions and are more likely to have superior access to information; thus, they 
are in a better position to bear the costs of unintentional deception.239  
Better information to consumer sellers could also diminish some of the risks 
consumer sellers face. For instance, gold buyers may be more forthcoming about 
price information if sellers did not have to prove intent. Also, ridesharing platforms 
might offer more training about safety risks with looser standards for deceptive acts. 
3. Providing attorneys’ fees for consumer sellers. 
Finally, policymakers should permit consumer sellers to recover attorneys’ fees. 
Awarding attorneys’ fees to consumer sellers would be extraordinary given the 
default rule in America of each party paying its own fees.240 However, consumers 
generally cannot pursue causes of action for deception in the absence of a fee-shifting 
statute: “Consumer fraud statutes were enacted to protect consumers in disputes with 
businesses. The legislatures reasoned that consumers would not be able to obtain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 237. Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted). 
 238. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
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recovery for fraud unless the requirements for proof of fraud were relaxed and 
consumers could obtain attorney fees.”241 Awarding attorneys’ fees to consumer 
sellers (1) would incentivize private lawyers to act in the public interest like private 
attorneys general;242 (2) would encourage consumer sellers to bring lawsuits;243 and 
(3) would provide access to justice even in cases involving minor losses.244 Lawsuits 
could help police many of the negative behaviors that currently exist in markets 
where consumers are sellers, so policymakers should consider awarding prevailing 
consumer sellers their attorneys’ fees.  
 
* * * 
 
Overall, despite the significance of the shift to consumers as sellers, these policy 
suggestions offer moderate changes to contract and consumer protection law. They 
will not fix all of the problems in markets where consumers are sellers, such as 
enduring problems involving discrimination. However, they offer immediate 
solutions to some of the problems that have plagued these economies, and perhaps 
more importantly, they open the door to rethinking how policymakers protect 
consumers acting as sellers. 
CONCLUSION 
When legal greats Karl N. Llewellyn, William A. Schnader, Soia Mentschikoff, 
and Grant Gilmore were drafting the Uniform Commercial Code, consumers almost 
always did the same thing—buy. In that context and the context surrounding the 
consumer protection statutes passed in the following decades, it made sense for 
lawmakers to focus on protecting buyers. But, as Bob Dylan wrote in this same era, 
“the times, they are a-changin’.”245 Now, consumers act as sellers in a substantial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 241. Edward X. Clinton, Jr., Do Businesses Have Standing to Sue Under State Consumer 
Fraud Statutes?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 385, 400–01 (1996); see also Jean Braucher, Foreword: 
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 243. In re McClendon, 488 B.R. 876, 897 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2013) (“One of the policy 
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 244. Heyert v. Taddese, 70 A.3d 680, 713 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (“The purpose 
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number of transactions, such as those in the sharing economy. It is time for consumer 
law scholars and lawmakers to recognize consumers as sellers and respond to protect 
consumers as sellers. 
